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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ERNEST EVANS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
    v.
HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants.
                                                                     /
No. C 13-02477 WHA
ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART 
MOTION TO DISMISS
INTRODUCTION
In this trademark dispute, defendants move to dismiss all claims.  For the reasons
below, the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
STATEMENT
Defendant Hewlett-Packard Company is a multinational technology corporation. 
Defendant Palm, Inc. is allegedly a wholly-owned subsidiary of HP.  “The Chubby Checker” is
the name of a risqué software application offered for sale and download on the HP App
Catalogue, a web-based store operated by Palm and HP.  The app purports to estimate the size
of a man’s genitals based on his shoe size.  The name “Chubby Checker” is thus used as a
vulgar pun.
Plaintiff Ernest Evans is and has long been known by his stage name “Chubby
Checker.”  The complaint describes him as “a legendary musical entertainer” with “icon-
status.”  Plaintiffs The Last Twist Inc. and The Ernest Evans Corporation own various
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2
registered marks associated with the name “Chubby Checker” (Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 15, 30, Exhs.
A–G).  
The complaint alleges that defendants began offering the Chubby Checker app for sale
on the HP App Catalogue in October 2006.  Defendants allegedly did so with actual knowledge
of plaintiffs’ marks and actual knowledge that no plaintiff had consented to the use of the
marks.  Defendants nonetheless knowingly and willfully advertised, marketed, and sold the app
in violation of those marks.  In order for an app to be offered for sale on the HP App
Catalogue, defendants employed an “application and approval process and knowingly decided
to approve, accept, upload, host, market, advertise, sell and make provisions for the
maintenance and updating of ‘The Chubby Checker’ app” (id. at ¶ 29).  Plaintiffs allege that at
all relevant times, defendants “maintained primary control” of the use of the name and mark,
as well as control over the revenues generated from sales of the app.  The complaint does not
allege, however, that defendants were responsible for the creation or naming of the app.  
In September 2012, plaintiffs informed defendants of the alleged infringement by way
of a cease-and-desist letter, though the complaint alleges that “[a]s of the filing of this law suit
[on February 12, 2013], the infringement continues” (id. at ¶ 37).  The complaint alleges
claims for:  (1) federal trademark infringement, (2) federal trademark dilution, (3) federal
unfair competition, (4) common law unfair competition, (5) common law trademark
infringement, (6) unauthorized use of name or likeness under Pennsylvania law, and (7)
unauthorized use of name or likeness under California law.  Defendants now move to dismiss
all claims.
ANALYSIS
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 663 (2009).  A claim is facially plausible when there are sufficient factual allegations
to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.  While a
court “must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true,” it is “not bound to
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3
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
1. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT.
Defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to adequately state their various federal and
common law claims for trademark infringement.  This order disagrees.
The crux of defendants’ argument is that the complaint only attempts to plead claims
for contributory infringement and not for direct infringement.  To be liable for contributory
infringement, defendants argue that they must have had actual knowledge of the infringement
and yet continued to sell the app.  Defendants urge that the complaint fails to allege either that
defendants knew of the infringement or that defendants continued to sell the app after
receiving plaintiffs’ cease-and-desist letter.  This claim is incorrect.
The complaint specifically alleges that when defendants chose to place the app in
commerce, defendants had “actual knowledge” that none of the plaintiffs had consented to the
use of the name “Chubby Checker,” and that defendants had “full knowledge” of plaintiffs’
marks from the beginning of their approval process (Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 29–30).  Defendants swat
these allegations aside because some are made “upon information and belief.”  But the
complaint alleges sufficient facts to support these beliefs, such that the claims are plausible. 
For example, the complaint alleges that the Mr. Evans is famous and internationally known by
his stage name and registered trademark “Chubby Checker.”  The complaint alleges that the
app catalog maintained by defendants advertised the lascivious nature of the app and that
defendants “maintained primary control over the use of the name and mark ‘The Chubby
Checker’ in connection with . . . the offending app.”  The complaint further alleges that
defendants employed a detailed application and approval process for the app (id. at ¶¶ 1,
15–18, 27–31).  Construed favorably to the plaintiffs, these allegations are sufficient to permit
an inference that defendants knew, or could have reasonably deduced that the owner of the
Chubby Checker mark would never have consented to license the mark for such a vulgar
purpose.  
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This is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and the pleading
standards of Iqbal and Twombly.  Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ trademark
infringement claims is therefore DENIED.
2. SECTION 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT.
Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims are barred by Section 230
of the Communications and Decency Act.  This order agrees.
The CDA states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider,” and expressly preempts any state law to the contrary.  47 U.S.C. 230(c)(1), (e)(3). 
Put differently, the CDA safe harbor protects internet service providers from being sued based
on material published by content providers.  Section 230 was enacted “to promote the
continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services” and “to
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”  47 U.S.C.
230(b)(1)(2).  Our court of appeals has explained:
The majority of federal circuits have interpreted the CDA to
establish broad federal immunity to any cause of action that would
make service providers liable for information originating with a
third-party user of the service. . . .  Because material on a website
may be viewed across the Internet, and thus in more than one state
at a time, permitting the reach of any particular state’s definition of
intellectual property to dictate the contours of this federal
immunity would be contrary to Congress’s expressed goal of
insulating the development of the Internet from the various
state-law regimes.
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and
citations omitted, emphasis added).  Section 230 of the CDA bars state law claims against
internet service providers based on content created by a third party.  Ibid.  
Section 230(f)(3) defines a content provider as “any person or entity that is responsible,
in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the
Internet or any other interactive computer service.”  Our court of appeals held that if a website
provider displays content “created entirely by third parties, then it is only a service provider
with respect to that content.”  Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com,
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LLC, 521 F. 3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).  Although plaintiffs’ complaint is
cleverly-worded, it does not allege that defendants created the app at issue here.  Rather, it
appears that the app was created entirely by third parties.  Thus, this order holds that for the
purposes of Section 230, defendants are internet service providers that host third-party content
and not content providers.   
Plaintiffs rely on Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(Judge Lucy Koh), in an attempt to salvage their state law claims, but that decision is
inapposite.  In Fraley, the plaintiffs, who were users of the Facebook social networking site,
accused the company “not of publishing tortious content, but rather of creating and developing
commercial content that violates their statutory right of publicity.”  Id. at 801.  Facebook
created new content with information that it took from plaintiffs without their consent —
Facebook was therefore a content provider as well as a service provider, and thus not entitled
to immunity under Section 230.  Here, there are no comparable allegations that defendants
created or developed the app at issue (or any other app).  The allegations only show that
defendants’ HP App Catalogue is an interactive computer service provider.  It therefore enjoys
the broad immunity provided under Section 230 of the CDA from all state claims relating to
publishing content created by third parties.
Plaintiffs’ four state law claims — violation of Pennsylvania’s unfair competition and
trademark laws and Pennsylvania’s and California’s right of publicity statutes — are
preempted by the CDA.  Defendants’ motion to dismiss those claims is accordingly GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART.  Plaintiffs may seek leave to amend their amended complaint and will have
until AUGUST 30, 2013, to file a motion, noticed on the normal 35-day track, for leave to file a
second amended complaint.  A proposed amended complaint must be appended to this motion. 
Plaintiffs should plead their best case.  The motion should clearly explain how the amendments
to the complaint cure the deficiencies identified herein, and should include as an exhibit a
Case3:13-cv-02477-WHA   Document67   Filed08/15/13   Page5 of 6
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 D
is
tr
ic
t C
ou
rt
Fo
r t
he
 N
or
th
er
n 
D
is
tri
ct
 o
f C
al
ifo
rn
ia
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
6
redline or highlighted version identifying all changes.  If such a motion is not made, the answer
will be due ten calendar days thereafter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:   August 15, 2013.                                                                 
WILLIAM ALSUP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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